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This paper studies a Cournot duopoly in international trade so that the firms are exposed to exchange rate risk. A 
hedging opportunity is introduced by a forward market where the foreign currency can be traded on. We investigate 
two settings: First we assume that hedging and output decisions are taken simultaneously. We show that hedging is just 
done for risk managing reasons as it is not possible to use hedging strategically. In this setting the well-known 
separation result of the competitive firm holds if both firms have the hedging opportunity. In the second setting the 
hedging decisions are made before the output decisions. We show that hedging is used not only to manage the risk 
exposure but also as a strategic device. Furthermore we find that no separation result can be stated. 
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While the competitive ﬁrm under exchange rate risk and with and without
a hedging opportunity has been discussed in detail in the literature, there is
still a lack of treatment of imperfect markets like oligopolies.1 This paper
is a contribution to ﬁll this lack as we consider a Cournot duopoly under
exchange rate risk and with the opportunity to use currency forward con-
tracts.2 We investigate two settings: In the ﬁrst one we assume that hedging
and output decisions are taken simultaneously by the ﬁrms. In the second
setting we assume that the hedging decisions are made before the output
decisions. Other studies which are concerned with the duopoly case under
uncertainty, too, can also be distinguished by their order of the hedging
and output decisions.3 The simultaneous case has only been examined by
Eldor/Zilcha (1990) for n identical ﬁrms and forward contracts for the ho-
mogeneous good. The ﬁrst paper that was concerned with the second case
is from Ungern-Sternberg/Weizs¨ acker (1990) in which any link between the
hedging and output decisions was ruled out.4 Allaz (1992), Allaz/Vila (1993)
and Broll et al. (1999a) also applied to the sequential case but did not rule out
that link. In all of these three particular settings it was shown that hedging
can be used as a strategic device. We also show in our setting that hedging
is used for strategical reasons besides the incentive for risk reduction. Hence,
the ﬁrms apply to overhedges in an unbiased forward market. In the simul-
taneous case the ﬁrms apply to full hedges in an unbiased forward market as
they are not able to use hedging in a strategical manner. Therefore it is even
possible in this case that a ﬁrm is harmed if getting the hedging opportunity.
1For the competitive ﬁrm under price risk see e.g. Holthausen (1979) and under ex-
change rate and price risk see Kawai/Zilcha (1986). In more recent studies these models
have been expanded in various ways. For example Broll et al. (1999b) examined the case
in which the ﬁrm exports to two foreign markets and futures are only available between
the foreign currencies. Wong (2003a) and (2003b) determined the case of currency options
in diﬀerent settings. Drees/Eckwert (2003) introduced a signal being correlated with the
exchange rate and which is observed prior to the date of decision making.
2If the ﬁrms have a motive to hedge risk at all is not a matter of our investigation. For
an enfolding discussion concerning this aspect see Froot et al. (1993) and Raposo (1999).
3Another similar distinction is made by Hughes/Kao (1997) comparing the cases of
observable and unobservable hedging decisions in the sequential framework.
4See Ungern-Sternberg/Weizs¨ acker (1990), p. 383.
2In the sequential case a ﬁrm is always better oﬀ if receiving an exclusive
hedging opportunity.
Furthermore we show that the well-known separation result of the compe-
titive ﬁrm5 holds in the simultaneous case if both ﬁrms are able to hedge
whereas in the sequential case no separation property can be found.
The paper is organized as follows. In the 2nd and 3rd section we ex-
amine the equilibrium outputs of the Cournot model under certainty and
uncertainty but without any hedging opportunities. These cases are used as
bases of comparison for the models with hedging. Section 4 is the main part
of this paper and is divided into two sections referring to the order of the
hedging and output decisions. For both settings we investigate the impact of
the hedging opportunity on the optimal outputs and expected utilities of the
ﬁrms. Thereby we show the strategic incentive of hedging. The last section
concludes.
2. The Certainty Case
This section is concerned with export production under certain exchange
rates to use it as a basis of comparison in later sections when uncertainty is
assumed. The derived equilibrium is the well-known Cournot-equilibrium. In
the literature many diﬀerent settings can be found that assure the existence of
an unique equilibrium.6 We follow Collie (1992)7 and discuss if it is possible
to attain, by imposing further assumptions, that the unique equilibrium is
solely determined by the ﬁrst order conditions. This is done in section 2.2.
But ﬁrst of all we have to deﬁne the setup of the model which is the basis
for extensions in later sections.
5See Holthausen (1979), p. 990.
6For an enfolding overview see Collie (1992), Friedman (1991), pp. 83-87 and 95-97 and
Vives (1999), pp. 93-101.
7See Collie (1992), pp. 60-64.
32.1 The Model
Consider a setting with two dates, t = 0,1 (one-period model), and two
exporting ﬁrms which are domiciled in countries using the same currency.8
Between the ﬁrst and the second date these ﬁrms produce a single homoge-
neous good. The output, xi ≥ 0 for i = 1,2, causes costs, ci xi with ci > 0 for
i = 1,2 and c1 6= c2, in t = 0, which are denominated in the home currency. In
the second date, t = 1, both ﬁrms sell their entire output in the same foreign
country so that the revenues, being received in t = 1, are denominated in the
foreign currency as well as the price per unit of the good, p = p(x1 + x2).9
The price is given by the inverse demand of the good which is speciﬁed by
a downward-sloping function being twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Hence,
the proﬁt functions in t = 1, denominated in the home currency, are deﬁned
as follows:10
Πi = (ep − ci)xi for i = 1,2. (1)
We assume the ﬁrms to act as Cournot duopolists who are not inﬂuenced by
the past behaviour of themselves and the other ﬁrm and are only concerned
about their proﬁts in t = 1. That means they do not care about the implica-
tions their behaviour might have for the future. Therefore each ﬁrm chooses
its output in t = 0 in order to maximize its proﬁt in t = 1 while assuming
that the output of the other duopolist is invariant with respect to its own
decision.11 For this reason the choice of the output can be referred to as a
best response to the output of the other duopolist and so in an equilibrium
the outputs of both ﬁrms have to be best responses to each other. Hence,
such an equilibrium is called a Cournot-Nash one.12
8Throughout the paper we call this currency the home one.
9It is assumed that the home currency and the foreign one are not the same.
10The exchange rate between the home and the foreign currency in t = 1 is symbolized
by e with e ∈ (0,emax]. The dimension of e is units of the home currency per one unit of
the foreign currency. Furthermore we assume a riskless interest rate of zero for the period
between t = 0 and t = 1 so that the costs which occure in t = 0 remain the same in t = 1.
All parameters of the model are common knowledge.
11See Rasmusen (1991), p. 78.
12For instance see Rasmusen (1991), pp. 76-78. or Vives (1999), p. 93.
42.2 The Equilibrium
We start with the deﬁnition of the two assumptions which assure the existence
of an unique equilibrium in the present setting:13
(A1) The total revenue, (x1 + x2)p, is bounded.
(A2) The outputs of the ﬁrms are strategic substitutes so that p0 +xi p00 < 0
for i = 1,2.14
Proposition 1. Under the assumptions (A1) and (A2) there exists an unique
Cournot-Nash equilibrium.15
As mentioned earlier, we want to investigate additional assumptions that
assure an interior solution so that the unique equilibrium is solely determined
by the ﬁrst order conditions of the duopolists. The following proposition
summarizes the results.
Proposition 2. (a) Under no more assumption it is possible that one or
both ﬁrms do not produce anything in the equilibrium.
(b) Under the assumption that ep(0) > min(c1,c2) at least one ﬁrm pro-
duces in the equilibrium.
(c) Under the assumptions that c1 = c2 and ep(0) > c1 both ﬁrms produce
in the equilibrium.16
As we want the exporting ﬁrms not to be identical we state that c1 6= c2
in section 2.1. Thus we have to assume that the unique equilibrium is an

























2) = c2. (3)
13(A1) and (A2) are assumed to hold in later sections without stating them explicitly.
14See Bulow et al. (1985), p. 494.
15See Collie (1992), pp. 60-64. One can easily prove that the required assumptions are
met in our setting.
16The proof can be found in appendix (I).
17A (∗) signiﬁes the optimal choice of a decision variable.
5We refer to these conditions in later sections when we compare these results
with those under exchange rate uncertainty.
3. The Uncertainty Case
In the present section uncertainty is introduced by assuming that the ex-
change rate ˜ e is a random variable and the ﬁrms only know whose probability
distribution.18 So the proﬁt functions are as follows:
˜ Πi = (˜ ep − ci)xi for i = 1,2. (4)
This means that the duopolists are only informed about the probability dis-
tribution of ˜ e in t = 1 when choosing their outputs in t = 0. Hence, the
decisions of the ﬁrms depend on their attitude towards risk. In the follow-
ing sections we consider two cases: In section 3.1 we assume risk-neutrality
and in section 3.2 we introduce von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
which imply risk-aversion.
3.1 Risk-Neutrality
Introducing a random exchange rate and assuming that both ﬁrms are risk-
neutral, ﬁnding an equilibrium is only slightly diﬀerent from the certainty
case as the ﬁrms now maximize in t = 0 the expected value of their proﬁts
instead of the proﬁts. Therefore we obtain familiar conditions that assure the
existence of an unique equilibrium even in the case of uncertainty.
Proposition 3. In the present model there exists an unique Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.19
If we want the unique equilibrium to be solely determined by the ﬁrst
order conditions we could derive a result that is analog to proposition 2.
18Throughout this paper a tilde (˜) signiﬁes a random variable. E(·) symbolizes the
expectation operator, Var(·) the variance and cov(·,·) the covariance.
19See Collie (1992), pp. 60-64. As E(˜ e) > 0 the conditions of Collie are still fulﬁlled in
the present case.
6Hence, we have to assume an interior solution to determine the equilibrium
























2) = c2. (6)
Proposition 4. Comparing the equilibria of propositions 1 and 3, we ﬁnd
that the outputs of the ﬁrms are the same in both equilibria if E(˜ e) =
e. Additionally assume that the equilibria are interior solutions, then the
optimal total output, x∗
total = x∗
1 + x∗
2, in the equilibrium under uncertainty
is greater [smaller] than under certainty if E(˜ e) > [<] e.20
Hence, introducing a risky exchange rate does not alter the results if
risk-neutrality is assumed and E(˜ e) = e holds. Furthermore we see that
the optimal total output rises if E(˜ e) > e while the change in the optimal
outputs of the ﬁrms is ambiguous. This proposition can also be interpreted
as a comparative static analysis considering the question how the optimal
outputs are altered by an increase of the exchange rate or expected exchange
rate, respectively. This increase causes two eﬀects: First, the ﬁrms increase
their outputs as the higher exchange rate implies higher marginal revenue.
Second, higher outputs decrease the price which in turn lowers the marginal
revenue and induces the ﬁrms to decrease their outputs. While the eﬀect of an
increase of the exchange rate on the individual output decision is ambiguous
the entire output increases. Hence, we cannot state whether an increasing
exchange rate arises or lowers the optimal proﬁts of the ﬁrms.
3.2 Risk-Aversion
In this section the ﬁrms are assumed to be risk-avers. Therefore we introduce
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions for both ﬁrms deﬁned over their
particular proﬁts denominated in the home currency. The utility functions
are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, U0
i(Πi) > 0, and
strictly concave, U00
i (Πi) < 0. Hence, to ﬁnd a Cournot-Nash equilibrium the
ﬁrms maximize their expected utilities by choosing an output and assuming
20The proof can be found in appendix (II).
7that the output of the other duopolist is invariant with respect to their own
decisions.
Following the procedure that we applied in the case of risk-neutrality, we
ﬁrst state conditions that assure the existence and uniqueness of an equi-
librium and afterwards this equilibrium will be compared with that under
risk-neutrality.
Proposition 5. In the current model a Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists.21





x2x1 > 0 holds, there is an unique interior equilibrium.22
These assumptions despite of being quite restrictive are common in the
literature.23 The reason for this is that it is not possible to ﬁnd other unique-
ness conditions in these kind of models which just restrict the inverse demand
function or the cost functions in some ways.
Having set up conditions that assure an unique, interior equilibrium we
are able to compare this equilibrium with that under risk-neutrality. The




























2) − c2)) = 0. (8)
Proposition 6. Comparing the equilibria under risk-aversion and risk-
neutrality and assuming that they are interior yields that the optimal total
output under risk-aversion is smaller than under risk-neutrality.24
Like in proposition 4 we are again able to determine the direction of
the change in the optimal entire output but not of the particular optimal
outputs. A reason for this is that there are two eﬀects which inﬂuence the
decision of a risk-avers ﬁrm if its revenue becomes stochastic. First, such a
ﬁrm wants to decrease its exposure towards risk which is only possible by
21See Friedman (1991), pp. 95-96. The conditions for existence are fulﬁlled in this model
as the expected utility functions are strict concave in the particular outputs.
22See Vives (1999), pp. 48 and 98. V i




23For instance see Asplund (2002), p. 997.
24The proof can be found in appendix (III).
8diminishing the output. Since the ﬁrm acts in an oligopoly market its own
decision depends on what the other ﬁrm does. Hence, if both ﬁrms diminish
their outputs in order to decrease their exposure towards risk, the price will
be higher which in turn is an incentive to increase the output. Whether the
ﬁrst or the second eﬀect dominates depends basically on the relation between
the degrees of risk-aversion of the ﬁrms.25
Another aspect which should be investigated is how the expected utilities
of risk-avers duopolists change from the certainty case to the present one. As
we will see in the next section the eﬀect is not clear-cut.
4. Hedging
In this section we extend the model by introducing an opportunity for one or
both ﬁrms to hedge the exchange rate risk. This is done by an arbitrage-free,
competitive currency forward market where the ﬁrms can deal with units of
the foreign currency at a pre-speciﬁed exchange rate of the home currency
against the foreign one, ef > 0.26 Before specifying this market in more
detail we have to decide whether the optimal hedging positions and outputs
are chosen simultaneously or sequentially. In order to constitute hedging as
a strategic device Allaz (1992) and Allaz/Vila (1993) argue that a simulta-
neous setting rules out any strategic link between the forward and the prod-
uct market which will become evident in the next section.27 Determining
the strategical impact of decisions that are taken before choosing the out-
puts has a long history in the oligopolistic literature. Just to mention a few
papers regarding this matter, Brander/Spencer (1983) and Brander/Lewis
(1986) examine the strategical impact of R&D expenditures and debt levels
25In the case of a competitive ﬁrm only the ﬁrst eﬀect exists so that the optimal output
of the ﬁrm under risk-neutrality is greater than under risk-aversion (see Sandmo (1971),
pp. 66-67 ).
26The units that are sold [purchased] on the forward market are denoted by a positive
[negative] Fi, i = 1,2. We assume forward rather than futures contracts as the last-
mentioned are standardized in their size and delivery date and are marked-to-market.
Furthermore we assume that no transaction costs have to be paid. To ensure that it is
not optimal to sell or purchase an inﬁnite large amount of the foreign currency we assume
that ef ∈ (emin,emax).
27See Allaz (1992), p. 298 and Allaz/Vila (1993), p. 2.
9as choice variables, respectively, and Vives (1989) e.g. shows how uncertainty
inﬂuences this impact in a model where the ﬁrms choose the production tech-
nology in the ﬁrst stage. One can also draw a connection to the literature
which is concerned with market entry as decisions that are taken before the
possible entry are driven by strategic motives.28 Additionally, see chapter
5 of Corch´ on (2001) who oﬀers a general approach to examining strategical
incentives in two-stage games. However, the question if the simultaneous or
the sequential setting is the right one cannot be answered in general, in fact
this question is an empirical one and depends on the particular industry that
is considered. Therefore we examine both settings and begin with the simul-
taneous one which we refer to as the non-strategical setting. The sequential
setting is called the strategical one.
4.1 Non-Strategical Hedging
This section is concerned with the case where the optimal hedging positions
and outputs are chosen simultaneously in t = 0.29 As the output is sold in
t = 1 we assume that the delivery date of the forwards is t = 1, too. Therefore
the forwards oﬀer a perfect hedging opportunity to the ﬁrms. In order to ﬁnd
out how this aﬀects the output decisions and the expected utilities of the
ﬁrms we ﬁrst allow only one ﬁrm to deal with forwards and afterwards both
ﬁrms, comparing the results with each other, the case without any hedging
opportunity and the certainty case.
4.1.1 Hedging Opportunity for one Firm
In this section forward contracts are only available to ﬁrm 1. This alters its
proﬁt function in t = 1:
˜ Π1 = (˜ ep − c1)x1 + F1 (ef − ˜ e). (9)
28See Dixit (1980) and Fudenberg/Tirole (1984), for instance.
29This simultaneous setting has been paid very little attention to in the literature. The
almost only article which is worth mentioning is from Eldor/Zilcha (1990). They deal with
n identical ﬁrms and an inverse demand function that contains a stochastic element. The
hedging opportunity is given to all ﬁrms and hedging is done by trading the homogeneous
good on a forward market.
10Before starting the comparisons mentioned above, we state conditions that
assure the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and characterize some
interesting properties of the optimal choices.
Proposition 7. In the present model an interior, unique Cournot-Nash equi-
librium (now consisting of x∗
1, x∗
2 and F ∗
1) exists if assuming that all candidate
equilibria are interior and the determinant of the Jacobian of the negative
marginal utilities is positive.30 Then the optimal outputs of the ﬁrms are


























2) − c2)) = 0. (11)
Equation (10) shows that ﬁrm 1’s condition for its optimal output is
the same as if the ﬁrm was in the certainty case with ef substituting the
deterministic exchange rate. Hence, we can state a weak separation result:
Proposition 8. The optimal output decisions are independent of the optimal
hedging decision of ﬁrm 1 and its attitude towards risk, but depend on ﬁrm
2’s attitude towards risk and on the probability distribution of ˜ e.32
The obtained separation result is weaker than in the case of a competitive
ﬁrm where the optimal output decision is independent of the optimal hedging
decision, the probability distribution of the exchange rate and any attitude
towards risk.33 That is not surprising at all, because in the present setting
ﬁrm 2 has no hedging opportunity so that its optimality condition contains
ﬁrm 2’s utility function and the stochastic exchange rate. The dependencies
of ﬁrm 2’s optimal output decision in turn carry over to ﬁrm 1’s optimal
output decision due to the duopoly product market.
So far we missed to examine the optimal hedging decision of ﬁrm 1. In
order to do this we have to make some deﬁnitions:
30See Vives (1999), pp. 48 and 98. It can be shown that both expected utility functions
are concave in their choice variables.
31The ﬁrst condition results from equating both ﬁrst order conditions of ﬁrm 1 with
each other. Whereas the second condition is the ﬁrst order condition of ﬁrm 2.
32These conclusions follow directly form the ﬁrst order conditions. See Eldor/Zilcha
(1990) on page 20 for similar separation results if ef = E(˜ e) holds.
33For instance see Holthausen (1979), p. 990.
11Deﬁnition 1. The forward market is called unbiased if ef = E(˜ e). If ef >
E(˜ e) [ef < E(˜ e)] the foward market is referred to as to be in contango
[backwardation].
Deﬁnition 2. A hedging position that is equal to [greater than] [smaller
than] the revenue in the foreign currency is called a full hedge [overhedge]
[underhedge].
The following proposition shows a direct link between the situation on
the forward market and the optimal hedging decision:
Proposition 9. The optimal hedging position of ﬁrm 1 is a full hedge [over-
hedge] [underhedge] if the forward market is unbiased [in contango] [in back-
wardation].34
The obtained link is exactly the same as in the case of a competitive
ﬁrm.35 The result of the proposition is a direct consequence of the risk-
aversion of ﬁrm 1. The forward market enables the ﬁrm to reduce its expo-
sure towards risk. If the forward market is unbiased this risk reduction is
”costless” which induces the ﬁrm to dispose of any risk, whereas in a biased
forward market risk reduction is not costless so that it is optimal to take
some risk.36 The reason why the hedging decision of ﬁrm 1 is solely driven
by its incentive for risk reduction and not by strategical incentives is that
the simultaneous setting rules out any strategic link between the forward and
the product market.37 This means that even though the hedging opportu-
nity for ﬁrm 1 alters its optimality condition on the product market which in
turn induces the optimal outputs of both ﬁrms to change, ﬁrm 1 is not able
to use this connection in a strategical manner as it cannot credibly commit
to depart from the stated optimal hedging position. To specify, due to the
simultaneous setting and the common knowledge assumption ﬁrm 2 knows
ﬁrm 1’s optimality conditions and behaves accordingly so that ﬁrm 1’s best
34The proof can be found in appendix (IV). See Eldor/Zilcha (1990) on page 19 for the
same result in their setting.
35For instance see Holthausen (1979), p. 990.
36In this context ”costless” means that risk can be removed at an actuarial fair price.
37See Allaz (1992), p. 298 and Allaz/Vila (1993), p. 2.
12responses are determined. As we will see in section 4.2 this is not the case in
the sequential setting.38
After examining the optimal decisions of the ﬁrms we turn over to the
comparisons mentioned at the outset of section 4.1. For convenience we as-
sume the forward market to be unbiased so that ﬁrm 1’s optimal hedging
position is a full hedge under the conditions of Proposition 7. First we com-
pare the current setting with the certainty case:39
Proposition 10. Comparing the equilibria of propositions 1 and 7 we ﬁnd
that:40 (i) the optimal output of ﬁrm 1 is greater than under certainty as
well as its expected utility is; (ii) the optimal output of ﬁrm 2 is smaller than
under certainty; (iii) the optimal total output is smaller than under certainty
which induces the price to be higher.41
Proposition 10 shows that changing from the certainty case to the current
one makes ﬁrm 2 act less aggressive due to its exposure towards risk. This
in turn enables ﬁrm 1 to produce more as its best-response function stays
the same in both settings.42 This is due to its hedging opportunity which
enables ﬁrm 1 to manage its risk via its hedging position. Also the expected
utility of ﬁrm 1 increases. Hence, in this comparison the unbiased hedging
opportunity for ﬁrm 1 can be referred to as an advantage.
The result concerning ﬁrm 2’s expected utility is ambiguous as it is deter-
mined by two antithetic eﬀects which cannot be generally ordered in terms
of their size: On the one hand the decreasing output and risk-aversion cause
the expected utility to fall but on the other hand the higher price arises the
expected utility.
38Bulow et al. (1985) describe these coherences in a model under certainty in which two
ﬁrms compete on one market as duopolists and one ﬁrm can additionally sell its output on
a further market as a monopolist. They also distinguish whether the decision concerning
the monopoly market is made before or simultaneous to the decisions concerning the
duopoly market (see particularly Bulow et al. (1985) on page 499). Note that we use the
term ”strategic” in the sense of Allaz (1992) and not in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985)
as the latter use this term in the simultaneous setting, too.
39We assume that ef = e holds.
40We assume the equilibrium under certainty to be interior.
41The proof can be found in appendix (V).
42The best-response function of a ﬁrm under certainty is downward-sloping as the out-
puts of the ﬁrms are strategic substitutes (see (A2)).
13The next proposition is concerned with the comparison of the current
setting to that under uncertainty but without any hedging opportunity.
Proposition 11. Comparing the equilibria of propositions 5 and 7 we can
just state that the optimal output of ﬁrm 1 rises if the hedging opportunity
is made available to it.43
As stated subsequent to proposition 10 the hedging opportunity enables
ﬁrm 1 to choose its output like being under certainty which means acting
more aggressive. But how this inﬂuences ﬁrm 2’s output and the outputs’
sum cannot be stated as we indeed know the slope of ﬁrm 2’s best-response
function under certainty but not under uncertainty.
At a ﬁrst glance one could think that the expected utility of ﬁrm 1 has to rise
as the ﬁrm employs its hedging opportunity. But as we described subsequent
to proposition 9, ﬁrm 1 cannot use the hedging decision in a strategical
manner but has to follow its altered optimality conditions in order to give
a best response to ﬁrm 2’s decision which knows ﬁrm 1’s new conditions.
Hence, in the simultaneous setting it cannot generally be ruled out that
ﬁrm 1 is harmed due to its additional choice variable.44 In the case of a
competitive ﬁrm this is not possible as its optimal output increases and the
full hedge removes all uncertainty.45
4.1.2 Hedging Opportunity for both Firms
Now the forward market is made available to both ﬁrms. The conditions for
existence and uniqueness of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium are similar to those
of the previous section:
Proposition 12. Assuming that all candidate equilibria are interior an
unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium (now consisting of x∗
1, x∗
2, F ∗
1 and F ∗
2) exists
if the determinant of the Jacobian of the negative marginal utilities is posi-
tive.46 Then the optimal outputs are solely determined by the compounded
43The proof can be found in appendix (VI).
44See Bulow et al. (1985), pp. 490-491., who show an example in which this happens.
45See Holthausen (1979), p. 990.
46See Vives (1999), pp. 48 and 98.
























2) = c2. (13)
Hence, under the conditions of this proposition the optimal outputs are
determined by the same conditions as in the certainty case whereas ef sub-
stitutes e. This enables us to state a stronger separation result than in the
preceding section:47
Proposition 13. The optimal output decisions are independent of the opti-
mal hedging decisions, the probability distribution of the exchange rate and
the attitudes towards risk of both ﬁrms.48
The separation result is as in the case of a competitive ﬁrm.49 The optimal
outputs are set independent of anything that is inﬂuenced by the exchange
rate risk. The decision how risky the proﬁt should be is made by choosing
the optimal hedging position and is linked to the situation on the forward
market in the same manner as it was shown in proposition 9. Again, the ﬁrms
are not able to use their hedging decisions in a strategical manner so that
these decisions are solely driven bei risk managing incentives.
As in the foregoing section we want to determine how the hedging oppor-
tunity, now being available to both ﬁrms, alters the outputs and expected
utilities of the ﬁrms compared to the certainty case as well as to the cases
under uncertainty without hedging and with a hedging opportunity for one
ﬁrm. Again we will assume an unbiased forward market that induces full
hedges for both ﬁrms.
Starting with the comparison of the current setting with the certainty case
and assuming unique, interior solutions in both cases everything stays the
same as long as ef = e holds. This follows directly from proposition 12. The
47See proposition 8.
48This follows immediately from the compounded ﬁrst order conditions that determine
the optimal outputs (equation (12) and (13)). See Eldor/Zilcha (1990) on page 20 for
similar separation results in the case of an unbiased forward market.
49For instance see Holthausen (1979), p. 990.
15reason for this is the separation result which states that the ﬁrms act, with
respect to their ouputs, as if they were under certainty. Because managing
their risk exposure is done by means of their hedging positions. The results for
ef 6= e can be derived analogous to proposition 4 and can also be interpreted
in the same way.50 Hence, we turn over to the next comparison.
As the current setting and the certainty case constitute the same results
if assuming interior solutions, comparing the current setting to that under
uncertainty but without any hedging opportunity is equivalent to the com-
parison of the last mentioned case with the certainty one. This has already
been done for the outputs in proposition 6. Now that result is reversed: The
optimal total output increases if forward contracts are made available to both
ﬁrms.51
Although our intuition tells us that the hedging opportunity for both ﬁrms
should increase their expected utilities this cannot be said in general. This
is because of two contrary and one ambiguous eﬀects altering the expected
utility of a ﬁrm: First the increasing optimal total output lowers the price
which in turn induces the expected utility to decrease. Second providing a full
hedge yields a deterministic proﬁt that increases the expected utility. Third
we are not able to decide how the optimal output of the particular ﬁrm is
altered. For example in the setting of Eldor/Zilcha (1990) it is even possible
that both ﬁrms are harmed by introducing an unbiased forward market.52
Completing, the change from the case of section 4.1.1 to the current one
yields the exact contrary of proposition 10 due to the similarity of the current
case and the certainty one: The optimal output of ﬁrm 1 and its expected
utility decrease whereas the optimal output of ﬁrm 2 increases. The optimal
total output is higher resulting in a lower price. As described subsequent to
proposition 11 receiving the hedging opportunity does not necessarily led to
a higher expected utility which is also valid for ﬁrm 2 in this comparison.
In the following section we skip the assumption that hedging and out-
50As the results derived in proposition 4 for the optimal outputs are ambiguous this
ambiguity carries over to the expected utilities.
51See proposition 6, its proof and its interpretation. The same result is obtained in the
setting of Eldor/Zilcha (1999) on pp. 20 and 22.
52See Eldor/Zilcha (1990), p. 21.
16put decisions are made simultaneously and turn over to the case where the
decisions are made sequentially.
4.2 Strategical Hedging
In order to design a sequential setting we assume that the hedging decisions
are made in t = −1 and that their delivery date is t = 1.53 Hence, in t = 0
the optimal forward decisions have already been taken and as we assume
them to be common knowledge they have to be taken into account when
choosing the optimal outputs. The applied equilibrium concept is therefore
the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) from Selten (1965). A SPNE
strategy choice in the current setting consists of the optimal hedging positions
and a pair of strategy sets for the outputs that constitute a Cournot-Nash





As in the previous section we want to investigate how this hedging oppor-
tunity aﬀects the outputs, the market price and the expected utilities of the
ﬁrms. We ﬁrst assume that the hedging opportunity is only available to one
ﬁrm and thereafter to both ﬁrms. The derived results are compared with
each other, the certainty case and the case without any hedging opportunity.
4.2.1 Hedging Opportunity for one Firm
Assume that the hedging opportunity is only available to ﬁrm 1. To derive the
SPNE we ﬁrst have to determine the particular Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of the outputs in t = 0 for all possible forward positions. Afterwards we
go back to t = −1 and determine the optimal hedging position taking into
account how this choice aﬀects the optimal outputs. The next proposition
53As the expectations concerning the exchange rate in t = 1 are assumed to be the same
in t = −1 and t = 0 the forward contracts oﬀer a perfect hedging opportunity to the ﬁrms.
54We write x
+
i (F1,F2), i = 1,2 to point that the hedging positions are not optimal. The
only article that is concerned with a similar setting is a working paper from Broll et al.
(1999a). They assume one ﬁrm to be under certainty all the time. Besides this paper there
are articles from Allaz (1992), Allaz/Vila (1993) and Hughes/Kao (1997) that apply to
a sequential setting, too, but consider the forward market for the homogeneous good. As
will be seen later this diﬀerence is crucial for the strategical impact of hedging. Moreover
the last three articles assume that the output decisions are taken under certainty.
17states conditions that assure the existence and uniqueness of the particular
Cournot-Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 14. In the present model and given a hedging position F1, an
interior, unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists in t = 0 if assuming that
all candidate equilibria are interior and V 1
x1x1V 2
x2x2 − V 1
x1x2V 2
x2x1 > 0 holds.55
Under the conditions of proposition 14 the optimal outputs are deter-
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(15)
Now we go back to t = −1 to ﬁnd the optimal hedging position. Therefore we
have to maximize ﬁrm 1’s expected utility subject to its optimality condition
in t = 0. F ∗
























1))) = ef. (16)
From equation (16) we see that the optimal hedging decision depends on the
probability distribution of the exchange rate and ﬁrm 1’s attitude towards
risk. These dependencies carry over to the optimal outputs as the outputs
depend on the hedging position. Moreover the outputs depend on ﬁrm 2’s
attitude towards risk as can be concluded from equation (15). Hence, it is
not possible to state any separation result.
In order to show that hedging can be seen as a strategic device the next
proposition deals with the eﬀect an increasing hedging position has on the
optimal outputs:
Proposition 15. Assume that (i) the forward market is unbiased, (ii) the
outputs are strategic substitutes in the current environment (V i
xixj < 0, i,j =
55See Vives (1999), pp. 48 and 98.
56We assume that the optimal hedging position is unique and determined by its ﬁrst
order condition.
181,2, i 6= j) and (iii) the preferences of ﬁrm 1 exhibit non-increasing absolute
risk-aversion. Then an increase of the hedging position rises the optimal
output of ﬁrm 1 and lowers ﬁrm 2’s optimal output.57
Proposition 15 shows that ﬁrm 1 is able to aﬀect the output decisions
via its hedging position. The link between the forward and the product mar-
ket comes through the income eﬀect under risk aversion which induces the
best-response function of ﬁrm 1 to increase for an increasing hedging posi-
tion which means acting more aggressive.58 Therefore ﬁrm 1’s output rises
and as ﬁrm 2’s best-response function is downward-sloping (due to assuming
strategic substitutes) ﬁrm 2’ s output falls. To ﬁnd out if ﬁrm 1 uses this link
in a strategical manner, we determine ﬁrm 1’s optimal hedging position in
an unbiased forward market.
Proposition 16. If proposition 15 holds and the optimal hedging position
is determined by equation (16), then the optimal hedging decision of ﬁrm 1
is an overhedge.59
Hence, proposition 16 proves that hedging is used by ﬁrm 1 for strategical
reasons, too, besides its incentive for risk reduction. In contrast to the simul-
taneous setting this kind of usage is possible due to the sequential progression
as here ﬁrm 1 can credibly commit to a hedging position that is diﬀerent from
that one which is solely driven by risk managing incentives. Hence, ﬁrm 1
chooses its hedging position incorporating the impact this decision has on the
optimal outputs of both ﬁrms.60 Therefore the ﬁrm that exclusively receives
57The proof can be found in appendix (VII). See Broll et al. (1999a) on page 8 for
the same result in their setting. So as to derive ”intuitive” results in comparative static
analysis it is common to assume the best-response functions to be downward-sloping and
the equilibrium to be stable (see Vives (1999), p. 102). Both conditions are met in our
setting: The best-response functions are downward-sloping as we assumed the outputs to
be strategic substitutes in the current environment (see Vives (1999), p. 36). Then the
stability of the unique equilibrium follows from the conditions of proposition 14 (see Vives
(1999), p. 51).
58See Broll et al. (1999a), pp. 10-13.
59The proof can be found in appendix (VIII). See Broll et al. (1999a), p. 13.
60Compare the optimality conditions concerning ﬁrm 1’s hedging position of the simul-
taneous (23) and the sequential setting (16) with each other.
19such a hedging opportunity can never be harmed by this.61
If ﬁrm 1 is risk-neutral the described link of proposition 15 disappears
as the hedging position no longer aﬀects the best-response functions of the
ﬁrms in t = 0. Hence ﬁrm 1 cannot use hedging in a strategical manner.
Furthermore, a risk-neutral ﬁrm does not have an incentive to reduce risk
in this framework, so it does not apply to hedging in an unbiased forward
market at all.62 This is in contrast to the results of Allaz (1992), Allaz/Vila
(1993) and Hughes/Kao (1997) where a risk-neutral ﬁrm uses hedging as a
strategical device.63 The reason for this is that the forward market in their
articles is for the homogeneous good which induces a strategic link between
the forward and spot market as hedging aﬀects the marginal revenue from
spot sales which means aﬀecting the best-response functions.64
After examining the optimal decisions we turn over to the mentioned
comparisons and assume the forward market to be unbiased for convenience.
First we compare the current setting with that under uncertainty but without
any hedging opportunity.
Proposition 17. Under the conditions of proposition 16 the comparison of
the equilibria of propositions 5 and 14 yields that (i) the optimal output of
ﬁrm 1 is greater than without hedging as well as its expected utility is; (ii)
the optimal output of ﬁrm 2 is smaller than without hedging.65
The result of proposition 17 is a direct consequence of the link between
the forward and the product market as the optimal hedging position in the
current case is greater than null which induces the described changes in the
optimal outputs. The expected utility of ﬁrm 1 increases, too, if changing
from the case without forward contracts to the current one as otherwise
ﬁrm 1 would not apply to hedging. Note that this conclusion is only true for
61See Bulow et al. (1985), particularly on p. 499, who state an analoguos result for their
setting and generalize it to ”any decision [ﬁrm] A might take at one time that would aﬀect
its marginal proﬁtability at a later time.”.
62See Broll et al. (1999a), p. 10.
63Note that all of them apply to the sequential setting.
64See Allaz (1992), p. 305 or Allaz/Vila (1993), p. 2.
65This follows directly from proposition 15 as the optimal hedging position is an over-
hedge (see proposition 16).
20the sequential setting as we explained subsequent to proposition 16. Hence,
receiving exclusively such a hedging opportunity is an advantage for ﬁrm 1.
If ﬁrm 2 is harmed in terms of expected utility cannot be said in general, as
the eﬀect of the hedging position on the optimal total output and the price
is not clear-cut.
The next comparison is concerned with the certainty case and the current
one.66
Proposition 18. Under the conditions of propositions 16 the comparison of
the equilibria of proposition 1 and 14 yields that the optimal output of ﬁrm 1
is greater and ﬁrm 2’s optimal output is smaller than under certainty.67
In this proposition both ﬁrms alter their behaviour. While ﬁrm 2 acts
less aggressive due to uncertainty, ﬁrm 1 acts more aggressive as it uses the
sequential hedging opportunity in a strategic manner. If ﬁrm 1 would use the
hedging opportunity just to manage its risk exposure it would have chosen a
full hedge and would have induced a behaviour like under certainty.
As in the previous comparison the altering of the optimal total output is not
clear-cut so that the investigation how the expected utilities of the ﬁrms are
changed yields ambiguous results.
4.2.2 Hedging Opportunity for both Firms
Completing the strategical setting we allow both ﬁrms to deal with forward
contracts. As in the preceding section the SPNE is derived by ﬁrst deter-
mining the Cournot-Nash equilibria of the outputs in t = 0 for all possible
forward positions of both ﬁrms. Thereafter the optimal hedging positions in
t = −1 are determined while taking into account how this aﬀects the opti-
mal outputs. The condititions that assure the existence and uniqueness of a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium are similar to those of proposition 14:
Proposition 19. In the present model and given the hedging positions F1
and F2 an interior, unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists in t = 0 if assum-
66We assume that the equilibrium under certainty is interior and that ef = e holds.
67The proof can be found in appendix (IX).
21ing that all candidate equilibria are interior and V 1
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Hence, under the conditions of proposition 19 the optimal outputs are un-
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The optimal hedging positions in t = −1 are found by maximizing the expec-
ted utility of both ﬁrms subject to the optimality conditions in t = 0. F ∗
1 and
F ∗
































2)) = ef. (20)
Again a separation result cannot be stated as the optimal hedging positions
of the ﬁrms depend on the probability distribution of the exchange rate and
the particular attitudes towards risk. These dependencies carry over to the
optimal outputs as the outputs in turn depend on the hedging positions.
Furthermore the comparative static results of proposition 15 are still valid
and can be repeated for F2 in an analogous manner: A higher forward position
of ﬁrm i, i = 1,2, increases its own best-response function and therefore
promotes its own output and deters the output of the other ﬁrm. Just like
in proposition 16 it can be shown that both ﬁrms apply to overhedges in an
unbiased forward market. Hence, the ﬁrms use forward contracts not only
to reduce risk but for strategic reasons, too, since otherwise their optimal
hedging positions would be full hedges.71
68See Vives (1999), pp. 48 and 98.
69For convenience we write x
+
i instead of x
+
i (F1,F2), i = 1,2.
70We assume that the optimal hedging positions are unique and determined by their
particular ﬁrst order conditions. For convenience we write x∗











j , i 6= j and i,j = 1,2.
71See section 4.1.2.
22In the following comparisons the forward market is assumed to be un-
biased. First we compare the case without any hedging opportunity to the
current one.
Proposition 20. If the comparative static results mentioned above hold for
both ﬁrms and if the optimal hedging positions are determined by equations
(19) and (20), the comparison of the equilibria of propositions 5 and 19 yields
that the total optimal output becomes larger when changing from the case
without hedging to the current one.72
Both ﬁrms act more aggressive due to the availability of the forward con-
tracts as they increase their hedging positions. Therefore the results concern-
ing the optimal outputs are ambiguous which carries over to the expected
utilities of the ﬁrms. Possibly both ﬁrms are better oﬀ if neither hedging
opportunity exists as it was shown for risk-neutral ﬁrms in the setting of
Allaz.73
Comparing the current case with that from section 4.2.1 yields ambiguous
results for the optimal outputs, because it is indeed possible to state that
ﬁrm 2 becomes more aggressive as its hedging position increases, but ﬁrm 1
can increase its hedging position and act more aggressive, too. It is even
ambiguous if ﬁrm 2 beneﬁts from receiving the hedging opportunity as the
hedging position has to be chosen simultaneously to ﬁrm 1’s position.74
The last comparison is concerned with the current case and the certainty
one.75
Proposition 21. If the comparative static results mentioned above hold for
both ﬁrms and if the optimal hedging positions are determined by equa-
tions (19) and (20) the comparison of the equilibria of propositions 1 and 19
72The proof can be found in appendix (X).
73See Allaz (1992), p. 305.
74To see an example in which the second ﬁrm is harmed, modify Bulow et al. (1985),
pp. 490-491, in the following manner: The outputs for the monopoly market are chosen
before those for the duopoly one and the price on the monopoly market is 59,95 regardless
the quantity which is sold by one or both ﬁrms. If you compare the case where only ﬁrm
A is able to sell on the monopoly market with that one where both can do so you will see
that ﬁrm B’s proﬁt declines.
75We assume that the equilibrium under certainty is interior and that ef = e holds.
23yields that the optimal total output in the current case is greater than under
certainty.76
If the ﬁrms did not use the forward contracts as strategic devices their
optimal hedging positions would have been full hedges and their outputs
and expected utilities would have stayed unaltered in comparison with the
certainty case.77 The strategical usage of the contracts makes the ﬁrms act
more aggressive on the product market yielding a higher total output and
stochastic proﬁts. Whether the expected utilities increase or decrease due to
the strategical usage is not clear-cut.
5. Concluding remarks
The purpose of our study was to extent the literature of a Cournot duopoly
under risk and with an opportunity to hedge this risk. We ﬁrst examined
the case where the hedging and output decisions are taken simultaneously.
Even though the hedging positions inﬂuence the optimal outputs it is not
possible to use them in this setting in a strategical manner.78 Hence, having
an exclusive, unbiased hedging opportunity indeed induces that the ﬁrm’s
optimal output is higher than in all other cases but its expected utility does
not have to rise in comparison to the uncertainty case without hedging. Fur-
thermore in the case of an exclusive hedging opportunity for one ﬁrm the
other one does not necessarily beneﬁt from receiving this opportunity, too.
Whether the ﬁrms prefer the case in which both have the unbiased hedging
opportunity to the uncertainty case without hedging or not is ambiguous.
Second we showed that in the sequential setting hedging is done by the
ﬁrms for two reasons: First they use them to reduce their exposures towards
risk which implies full hedges in an unbiased forward market. Second the
ﬁrms use the forward contracts as a strategic device because a higher hedging
position promotes the own output and deters the output of the competitor
76The proof can be found in appendix (XI).
77See section 4.1.2 for the result in the non-strategical setting.
78Therefore we were able to state the separation result in proposition 13.
24which implies overhedges in an unbiased forward market.79 Furthermore, the
sequential setting makes it impossible to state a separation result.
If a ﬁrm has an exclusive hedging opportunity its expected utility as well as
its optimal output is higher than in the case without hedging. Against, it
was not possible to state that this exclusive hedging opportunity makes the
ﬁrm better oﬀ if compared to the certainty case or the case where hedging
is available to both ﬁrms. As in the simultaneous setting whether the ﬁrms
prefer the situation where the unbiased hedging opportunity is available to
both of them to the case without hedging or not is ambiguous.
Appendix
(I) Proof of Proposition 2
Before we start the proof we have to deﬁne the best-response functions and
some special output levels:
Deﬁnition 3. The best-response function of ﬁrm i, fi(xj) with i 6= j and
i,j = 1,2, deﬁnes the best output ﬁrm i can choose if ﬁrm j produces xj.80
Under the assumptions of proposition 2 the best-response functions are
well-deﬁned.81 Following the proof of Collie (1992) we deﬁne output levels
¯ xi, i = 1,2 so that fj(xi) = 0 ∀ xi ≥ ¯ xi since p(¯ xi) = cj.82 Now we are able
to proof proposition 2:
(a) If fj(0) = xj with xj ≥ ¯ xj then fi(xj) = 0 for i,j = 1,2 and i 6=
j. Hence, the optimal output of ﬁrm i in the unique equilibrium is
null.83 To assure that both duopolists do not produce in the equilibrium
consider the case where ep(0) < min(c1,c2). As the inverse demand
79As we argued subsequent to proposition 16, the strategical usage of the forward con-
tracts is only possible in the sequential setting.
80See Rasmusen (1991), pp. 77-78.
81See Collie (1992), p. 62 or Friedman (1991), p. 84. Otherwise we would not have a
best-response function but a mapping as the image of fi(xj) could be a set.
82See Collie (1992), pp. 61-63.
83For example, let cj < ep(0) < ci.
25function is downward-sloping both ﬁrms are better oﬀ if producing
nothing.
(b) Assuming that both ﬁrms do not produce in the equilibrium we can
determine the following conﬂict: As ep(0) > min(c1,c2), w.l.o.g. we
can assume that ep(0) > c1. Hence, f1(0) > 0 as the inverse demand
function is continuous.
(c) Assume that f1(x2) = 0. Therefore we can conclude that x2 ≥ ¯ x2. And
as ep(¯ x2) = c1 = c2 = ep(¯ x1) we ﬁnd that ¯ x1 = ¯ x2 > 0.84 For this
reason ep(x2) ≤ c2 ∀ x2 ≥ ¯ x2. Hence, ﬁrm 2 is better oﬀ if choosing
an output x2 ∈ (0, ¯ x2). Furthermore, if x2 ∈ (0, ¯ x2) then f1(x2) ∈
(0, ¯ x1). Therefore the outputs of both ﬁrms are positive in the unique
equilibrium.
2
(II) Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of the ﬁrst part of the proposition follows directly as the condition
E(˜ e) = e causes the functions the ﬁrms maximize to be identical in the case
of certainty and uncertainty.
Since in the second part we assume interior solutions in both cases the eﬀect
of an inequality between E(˜ e) and e can be examined by comparing the ﬁrst
order conditions of both cases with each other ((2), (3) and (5), (6)). Hence,





2)), i = 1,2 have
to fall [rise] if changing from the certainty case to the current one. As these
terms depend on both outputs we have to consider the total diﬀerentials of
84¯ x1 > 0 follows directly from the assumption that ep(0) > c1 and the fact that the
inverse demand function is continuous.
26them to ﬁnd out how this aﬀects the optimal outputs:85
d(p + p
0 x1) =
∂(p + p0 x1)
∂x1
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∂(p + p0 x2)
∂x1
dx1 +





00 x2)dx1 + (2p
0 + p
00 x2)dx2.
To give an example how to determine the changes of the outputs with the
help of these equations take a look on the case in which (p + p0 x1) and
(p + p0 x2) have to fall.86 The possible cases are: (i) both outputs rise, (ii)
one output rises and the other one stays unaltered and (iii) one output falls
and the other one rises so strong that the total output rises. In all other cases
one can ﬁnd a contradiction. In this manner you can ﬁnd that the optimal
total output under uncertainty is greater [smaller] than under certainty if
E(˜ e) is greater [smaller] than e. The eﬀect on the particular optimal outputs
is ambiguous.
2
(III) Proof of Proposition 6


















2)) = c1, (21)
(
cov(U0














2)) = c2. (22)
You can show that in the equations (21) and (22) the particular terms which





2) are positive but smaller than
E(˜ e). Comparing equations (21) and (22) with those under risk-neutrality
((5) and (6)) and keeping in mind that the marginal costs, ci, are positive
85See Chiang/Wainwright (2005), p. 185. For simplicity we skip the arguments of the
inverse demand function.






2) have to be greater under risk-aversion than
under risk-neutrality. As in the proof of proposition 4 we have to consider the
total diﬀerentials of them to ﬁnd out how this aﬀects the optimal outputs:
d(p + p
0 x1) = (2p
0 + p




0 x2) = (p
0 + p
00 x2)dx1 + (2p
0 + p
00 x2)dx2.
From these equations it follows that the total output under risk-aversion
is smaller than under risk-neutrality while it is possible that one ﬁrm even
produces more under risk-aversion.
2
(IV) Proof of Proposition 9
Under these assumptions ﬁrm 1’s optimal hedging decision is solely deter-







which can also be written as:
ef =
cov(U0
1(˜ Π1), ˜ e)
E(U0
1(˜ Π1))
+ E(˜ e). (24)
So as to satisfy condition (24) the cov(·,·) has to be equal to [greater than]
[smaller than] null if ef = E(˜ e) [ef > E(˜ e)] [ef < E(˜ e)] which is done by






1(Π1)(px1 − F1). (25)
From the last equation the conclusions of the proposition follow immediately.
2
(V) Proof of Proposition 10
Comparing the ﬁrst order conditions of the certainty case ((2) and (3)) with
the relevant conditions in the current setting ((10) and (11)) we obtain that
28if changing from the certainty case to the current one p + p0 x1 has to stay
equal and p+p0 x2 has to rise. What this means for the optimal outputs can
be read oﬀ the total diﬀerentials of p + p0 xi, i = 1,2:
d(p + p
0 x1) = (2p
0 + p




0 x2) = (p
0 + p
00 x2)dx1 + (2p
0 + p
00 x2)dx2.
The expected utility of ﬁrm 1 has to rise in comparison to the certainty case
as the unbiased forward market causes a full hedge which induces the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt to be certain and as the deterministic proﬁt of the ﬁrm is higher. The
second argument infers from the fact that ﬁrm 1’s optimal output and the
price are higher than under certainty and that ef = e holds.
2
(VI) Proof of Proposition 11
In this case we cannot apply to the used way of proving, as comparing the ﬁrst
order conditions of the case under uncertainty without a hedging opportunity
((7) and (8)) with the relevant conditions in the current setting ((10) and
(11)) yields that if changing from the case without hedging to the current
one p+p0 x1 has to decrease whereas the alteration of p+p0 x2 is ambiguous.
Hence, we apply the optimal outputs of the current case to the optimali-
ty conditions of the uncertainty case which yields that ﬁrm 2’s optimality
condition is still fulﬁlled while V 1
x1 is negative. Therefore V 2
x2 has to stay
equal and V 1
x1 has to rise. What this means for the optimal outputs can be
read oﬀ the total diﬀerentials of V i
















87Note that V 1
x1x1V 2
x2x2 − V 1
x1x2V 2
x2x1 is assumed to be positive in proposition 5.
29(VII) Proof of Proposition 15
As x
+
1 (F1) and x
+
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0) − c1)(ef − ˜ e)).
V 1
x1x1 and V 2
x2x2 are negative as the expected utility functions are strict con-
cave in their particular outputs, whereas the negativity of V 1
x1x2 and V 2
x2x1
is assumed in the proposition. V 1
x1x1V 2
x2x2 − V 1
x1x2V 2
x2x1 is positive due to the
conditions of proposition 14 that are still valid. Hence, to prove the conclu-
sions of the proposition we have to show that M is negative. Therefore we
























The ﬁrst term of M is negative as ﬁrm 1 is risk-avers and (p + x
+
1 p0) is
positive due to the ﬁrst order condition (14).
If the preferences of ﬁrm 1 exhibit constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA)




1(Π1) = R(Π1) is a positive constant for
all possible values of ˜ e. Hence, by replacing U00
1(˜ Π1) by U0
1(˜ Π1) (multiplied
with a negative constant) in M’s second term and applying the ﬁrst order
condition (14) we obtain that M’s second term vanishes.
If the preferences of ﬁrm 1 exhibit decreasing absolute risk-aversion (DARA)
the second term of M is non-positive: The ﬁrst order condition (14) can be
written as
cov(U0

























Furthermore let ˆ Π1 be the proﬁt where ˜ e takes the value
c1
p+x+
1 p0, then the
second term of M can be extended in the following manner:
−
cov(U0
1(˜ Π1), ˜ e)
E(U0
1(˜ Π1))
E((R(˜ Π1) − R(ˆ Π1))U
0
1(˜ Π1)(˜ e(p + x
+
1 p
0) − c1)). (28)
If px
+
1 = F1 the second term of M is null as in this case the proﬁt becomes
deterministic so that R(˜ Π1) = R(ˆ Π1) holds.
If px
+
1 < F1, (R(Π1) − R(ˆ Π1)) and (e(p + x
+
1 p0) − c1) have the same signs
for all possible values of ˜ e and cov(U0




1 > F1, (R(Π1)−R(ˆ Π1)) and (e(p+x
+
1 p0)−c1) have opposite signs for
all possible values of ˜ e and cov(U0
1(˜ Π1), ˜ e) is negative. Therefore the second
term of M is negative again.
Summing all up, if the preferences of ﬁrm 1 exhibit either CARA or DARA
expression M is negative so that
dx+
1 (F1)





(VIII) Proof of Proposition 16
The ﬁrst order condition (16) for the optimal hedging decision in an unbiased
































The left-hand side of equation (29) is positive due to the results of
proposition 15 and the right-hand side is cov(U0
1(˜ Π1(F ∗
1)), ˜ e). For the covari-




1(Π1)(x1 p(x1 + x2) − F1).
2
31(IX) Proof of Proposition 18
The optimal hedging position is implicit deﬁned by equation (16). As in t = 0
the ﬁrms take F ∗
1 into account when determining the optimal outputs, this is
done for ﬁrm 1 by inserting equation (16) in its ﬁrst order condition in t = 0
(equation (14)) yielding the following condition:88
ef (p + x
∗
1 p






Now we compare the ﬁrst order conditions of the certainty case ((2) and
(3)) with the relevant conditions in the current setting ((30) and (15)): If
changing from the certainty case to the current one p+p0 x1 has to decrease
whereas p + p0 x2 has to increase. What this means for the optimal outputs
can be read oﬀ the total diﬀerentials of p + p0 xi, i = 1,2:
d(p + p
0 x1) = (2p
0 + p




0 x2) = (p
0 + p




(X) Proof of Proposition 20
As in the proof of proposition 18 the relevant conditions in the current case
are obtained by inserting equations (19) in (17) and (20) in (18):
ef (p + x
∗
1 p






ef (p + x
∗
2 p






Comparing these equations to the relevant conditions in the case without
hedging ((7) and (8)) yields that p + p0 x1 and p + p0 x2 have to decrease if
changing from the case without hedging to the current one. How this aﬀects
the optimal outputs can be read oﬀ the total diﬀerentials of p+p0 xi, i = 1,2:
d(p + p
0 x1) = (2p
0 + p




0 x2) = (p
0 + p




88The arguments of the functions are omitted for convenience.
32(XI) Proof of Proposition 21
The relevant conditions in the current setting are those of the proof of propo-
sition 20 ((31) and (32)). Comparing them with the conditions under cer-
tainty ((2) and (3)) yields that p + p0 x1 and p + p0 x2 have to decrease if
changing from the certainty case to the current one. Therefore the same re-
sult is obtained as in the proof of proposition 20.
2
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